

PART 5 FUNDRAISING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL PARTIES AND ADMINISTRATIONS

Chapter 30: Roger Tamraz

Roger E. Tamraz is an American businessman involved in investment banking and international energy projects. In the mid-1990s, he sought to become a “dealmaker” in an oil pipeline project that would cross the Caspian Sea region of Central Asia. In the hope of obtaining U.S. Government support for his project, Tamraz used his past relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, met with mid-level U.S. Government officials, and made political contributions to the Democratic Party.

The Committee's investigation focused on whether officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Democratic National Committee, the White House, or the Department of Energy improperly promoted Tamraz's pipeline proposal or gave him access to high-level government officials; why Tamraz was permitted to attend DNC events in the White House when staff had recommended that he not have any contact with high-level officials; and whether U.S. policy on the Caspian Sea pipeline changed as a result of Tamraz's political contributions or access to government officials.

FINDINGS

- (1) Roger Tamraz openly bought access from both political parties.**
- (2) Tamraz's attendance at DNC events was based on his political contributions and was unwise given the warnings that he might misuse such attendance.** DNC Chairman Donald Fowler endorsed Tamraz's attendance at these events, despite early warnings from DNC staff and opposition from NSC officials and Vice President Gore's staff.
- (3) A Central Intelligence Agency official promoted Tamraz's pipeline proposal in 1995, despite knowing that the NSC opposed it.**
- (4) An Energy Department official promoted additional political access for Tamraz in 1996, despite knowing that the NSC and other officials opposed it.**
- (5) U.S. policy in the Caspian Sea was not affected by Tamraz's lobbying, political contributions, or presence at DNC-related events.** This policy was solidified in early October 1995 and did not incorporate any aspect of Tamraz's proposal.

OVERVIEW

Tamraz was born in 1940 in Cairo, Egypt. He attended the American University of Cairo, Cambridge University, and Harvard Business School. In 1967, Tamraz went to work for the investment firm of Kidder, Peabody & Co., first in New York City, then in Beirut. He left in 1973 to establish his own Beirut-based investment-banking firm, the First Arabian Corporation. In the mid-1980s, Tamraz was chairman of Bank Al-Mashrek, Lebanon's second largest bank, as well as the head of Jet Holdings, which owned TransMediterranean Airway and Middle East Airlines. In 1989, Tamraz left Lebanon after being charged by the Lebanese government with embezzlement and negligence in connection with the failure of his Bank Al-Mashrek. He moved to the United States, became an American citizen, and founded TAMOIL, an oil company. Tamraz is currently President of Oil Capitol Limited.

Beginning as early as 1973, Tamraz's business ventures have received significant media coverage. In the 1980s, Tamraz learned the value of making political contributions when, as a legal permanent U.S. resident living in Beirut, he became a contributor to the Republican Party. As a result, he was recommended by the chairman of the Republican National Committee for a position with the Reagan Administration. Since that time, Tamraz was also reported to have had significant contact with the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), which apparently continued until shortly before this Committee's proceedings began in 1997.

In the 1990s, Tamraz, who was then living in New York City and Paris, was promoting a pipeline venture in the Caspian Sea region. In May and June of 1995, Tamraz met with many foreign officials and mid-level U.S. government officials, generally attempting to use every possible avenue to gain support for his pipeline proposal. In June 1995, the U.S. officials informed Tamraz that his proposal would not gain Administration support. Beginning that same month, a mid-level CIA official began to advocate Tamraz's pipeline proposal to the NSC, despite knowing that the NSC opposed it.

In July 1995, Tamraz began to contribute to the Democratic Party and concurrently to request official meetings with higher-level government officials. Tamraz never obtained an official meeting with the President or Vice President. Tamraz did, however, attend several DNC events where the President, Vice President or other Administration officials were present, despite opposition within the National Security Council and the Vice President office's to Tamraz's contact with high-level officials. DNC Chairman Donald Fowler supported Tamraz's attendance at DNC events, despite being aware of the objections to his attendance within the NSC and the Vice President's office.

In April 1996, a mid-level Department of Energy official also promoted Tamraz's efforts to gain access to President Clinton during a telephone conversation with an NSC official.

Despite all of these efforts, Tamraz was not successful in obtaining U.S. Government

support for his Caspian Sea pipeline proposal. In fact, the proposal supported by the U.S. -- a contract among several foreign governments and oil companies -- was signed on October 7, 1995, and did not involve Tamraz or his proposal.

The Committee investigated these issues by conducting numerous depositions and interviews, reviewing documents, and hearing two days of public testimony.¹

1970 -1990: TAMRAZ'S BUSINESS VENTURES, DEALINGS WITH THE CIA AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Business Ventures

In 1973, Fortune magazine reported that the Egyptian government had finally decided to build a pipeline from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean Sea.² According to Fortune, "What was most startling about the announcement was that the Sadat government gave the job, not to the eleven-nation consortium with which it had been negotiating for three years, but to the Wall Street firm of Kidder, Peabody & Co."³ The magazine highlighted the role of Tamraz, then 34 and Kidder's vice president in Beirut, as the individual responsible for negotiating the deal.⁴ The deal was reportedly worth \$345 million and Tamraz received a five percent share -- worth \$15 million at the time.⁵

In 1974, Tamraz established the First Arabian Corporation, which was a syndicate made up of wealthy Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian investors.⁶ In 1978, Newsweek reported that Tamraz "has been involved in some of the most widely publicized international business transactions of recent years."⁷ Tamraz himself summarized his approach: "I'm interested in things they say can't be done."⁸ Even then, Tamraz had detractors who saw him "as a promoter who hasn't delivered the goods."⁹

Reported Contacts with the CIA

According to Tamraz, it was during the early to mid-1970s that the CIA first turned to him for advice regarding the oil crisis.¹⁰ Thereafter, Tamraz apparently became a regular unofficial contact of the CIA -- "the kind of guy who knew everybody and you had lunch with him every couple of months," according to one former U.S. intelligence official.¹¹ Tamraz testified that since 1973, he has been in constant contact with CIA officials on a voluntary basis, estimating that in the past 25 years, he has probably had contact with roughly 20 to 25 different CIA employees.¹²

Tamraz testified that in the 1980s, his contacts with the CIA continued.¹³ According to Tamraz and press reports, then-CIA Director William J. Casey called on Tamraz after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.¹⁴ Casey reportedly asked Tamraz to intercede with Prime Minister Menachem Begin because Casey was frustrated with the slow pace of U.S.-led negotiations and hoped that Tamraz could use his high-level contacts to accelerate an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.¹⁵ Throughout these years, Tamraz testified that he has also hired former CIA employees, enhancing his connections with the agency.¹⁶

RNC's Recommendation for a Reagan Administration Position

Tamraz began to make political contributions to the Republican Party in the 1980s. He testified that he contributed enough money to the RNC to qualify as a Republican Eagle.¹⁷ Federal Election Commission records show that Tamraz gave \$32,000 to the Republican Party between 1981 and 1992, but Tamraz told Congressional Quarterly that he thought he gave more than that, possibly in "soft money" donations, which were not recorded at the FEC until 1991.¹⁸ Tamraz testified that he received a personal thank-you letter from President Ronald Reagan¹⁹ and an NSC official told the Committee that Tamraz had met twice with President Reagan.²⁰

In addition, then-RNC Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf, Jr., sent a letter on behalf of Tamraz to Robert Tuttle, Reagan White House Director of Presidential Personnel. Fahrenkopf recommended Tamraz for a position in the Reagan Administration, "on a committee or board connected with banking or petroleum, specifically relating to Arab countries."²¹ In support of this recommendation, Fahrenkopf not only pointed out that Tamraz was from Beirut, he also stated that "Mr. Tamraz is an Eagle, and a strong supporter of the Administration." Fahrenkopf then stated generally that Tamraz has expertise in banking and the petroleum industry.²² Tuttle replied to Fahrenkopf thanking him for his "letter in [sic] behalf of Roger Tamraz" and requesting that he forward Tamraz's resume for consideration.²³

Tamraz was never appointed to a position in the Reagan Administration, but the 1985 Fahrenkopf letter demonstrates that the recommendation was based on his political contributions. Upon learning that Tamraz had produced a copy of the letter to the Committee, Fahrenkopf stated in a letter to the Committee that during his tenure at the RNC he made many recommendations for similar appointments, although he does not believe he actually signed the Tamraz letter.²⁴

Tamraz Leaves Lebanon after Embezzlement Charges

Tamraz testified that in late 1988, forces hostile to Tamraz came to dominate the Lebanese political scene.²⁵ At that time, a run on Tamraz's Al-Mashrek Bank forced its collapse. Tamraz fled the country after claiming to have been kidnapped and later released in return for a multimillion-dollar ransom.²⁶ Subsequently, Lebanese officials brought charges against him for embezzlement and mismanagement.²⁷ Tamraz testified that these charges were politically motivated and were largely a result of his contacts with Israel.²⁸ Tamraz also testified that he was found innocent of any crime.²⁹ Lebanese authorities have sought his extradition through Interpol, but, according to Tamraz, "a Lebanese court-appointed authority determined in 1990 that there was not criminal activity" relating to his bank.³⁰ In 1992, however, the Lebanese authorities convicted him in absentia and there is an outstanding Interpol warrant for his arrest.³¹

1994-1995: THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT

During the Committee's investigation, allegations surfaced that the Clinton Administration's Commerce Department had selected individuals for Department trade missions based on their support of the Democratic Party. Although these allegations were not supported by the evidence presented to the Committee, see Chapter 26, the Committee obtained documents regarding the Department's contacts with Tamraz and his company, Oil Capital Limited. Documents and deposition testimony reveal that Tamraz was twice rebuffed by the Department of Commerce.

Prior to any political contributions to the Democratic Party, which were first made in July of 1995, Tamraz submitted an application to attend a 1994 trade mission with Secretary Ronald Brown.³² Tamraz's name was initially placed on a list of potential participants, but was later removed by the Office of the General Counsel after its vetting process discovered information on Lexis-Nexis that disqualified Tamraz.³³ Tamraz testified that he was told that he would not be invited to the trade mission because the department considered him unacceptable. Tamraz assumed that he was rejected because of the publicized embezzlement charges against him.³⁴

In October of 1995, Oil Capital Limited submitted a request to the Department seeking support for its attempt to purchase an energy concern in Hungary. The Commerce Department rejected this request as well. The Department's rejection was based again on Tamraz's questionable background and on uncertainties regarding Oil Capital's status as an American company.³⁵

1995: THE CASPIAN SEA PIPELINE

U.S. Policy on the Caspian Sea Pipeline

The United States has pursued a consistent pipeline policy throughout most of the world: the support of multiple pipelines for the transit of energy resources in order to diversify political and economic risks and enhance energy security.³⁶ U.S. policy in the Caspian Sea region of Central Asia was established in early 1995 and has two primary objectives: (1) support for multiple pipeline routes and (2) insistence that pipeline contracts be established and operated pursuant to commercially accepted principles.³⁷ Sheila Heslin, the NSC official in charge of implementing the U.S. Caspian Sea pipeline policy from April 1995 to November 1996, testified that in June 1995 the U.S. policy in the Caspian Sea region was "the development of multiple pipelines on commercially viable international terms."³⁸

The crucial period for the implementation of U.S. policy was from the spring of 1995 to October 7, 1995.³⁹ During this time, U.S. and foreign officials, an international consortium of foreign governments and private oil companies, as well private businessmen like Tamraz were in a contest to determine early pipeline routes and the financial terms for constructing and operating those routes.⁴⁰ Also during this time, Heslin chaired an interagency group on Caspian Sea pipeline policy, which according to Heslin, "coordinated policy very carefully We were very concerned to make sure U.S. policy was tightly coordinated because we feared that different agencies could easily be played off against each other."⁴¹ Tamraz's pipeline proposal and his activities in the Caspian Sea

region was a subject of discussion within the interagency group.

In the spring of 1995, the interagency group was concerned because Tamraz apparently was traveling in the Caspian Sea region attempting to become a dealmaker between governments and oil companies who hoped to be involved in the construction of an oil pipeline in the region.⁴² The group had also heard that Tamraz was calling his pipeline proposal a “peace pipeline” because he believed that his proposed route would foster peace in the region. The group understood, however, that the real incentive behind Tamraz’s pipeline proposal was the fact that he planned to retain five percent of the revenues in exchange for forging a deal. According to Heslin, Tamraz’s proposal to become a dealmaker, if successful, would have resulted in personal profit to Tamraz of approximately \$125 million.⁴³

The interagency group determined that Tamraz's proposal to become a “dealmaker” in the Caspian Sea pipeline project was contrary to U.S. policy, which sought commercially viable contracts without the intervention of dealmakers.⁴⁴ According to Heslin, the group nonetheless decided "that as an American, Roger Tamraz deserved a hearing in front of his Government, but that we should do so at a mid-level initially and then assess."⁴⁵ Agencies officials thereafter met with Tamraz to discuss his proposal and the CIA also became involved in the process.

Ultimately, on October 7, 1995, a contract was signed that provided for multiple early pipeline routes pursuant to commercially viable terms, thereby implementing U.S. policy.⁴⁶ Heslin testified that the success of U.S. policy was due in large part to the coordination within the executive branch of the Government, the importance placed on the policy by National Security Advisors Anthony Lake and Samuel R. Berger, and by President Clinton himself, who called President Heidar Aliyev of Azerbaijan "at the key moment" in the negotiations.⁴⁷

The project announced on October 7, 1995 did not incorporate any aspect of Tamraz’s proposal despite Tamraz’s efforts to become part of the project.⁴⁸ The Committee investigated some events surrounding the Caspian Sea pipeline issue, focusing on Tamraz’s attempts to become part of the project.

May-June 1995: Meetings with Executive Branch Officials

In May and June of 1995, several mid-level executive branch officials met with Tamraz to discuss his proposal. During these meetings, Tamraz sought to persuade the officials to support or, at least, not object to, his "peace pipeline" proposal.⁴⁹ This series of meetings was routine and proper, and occurred prior to any political contribution by Tamraz to the Democratic Party.⁵⁰ Testimony establishes that the officials met to listen to Tamraz's proposal as they did with many private individuals and businesses. No evidence was presented to the Committee that the agencies offered support for Tamraz's commercial interests.⁵¹

One of the meetings between Tamraz and executive branch meetings was with Sheila Heslin. According to Heslin, the meeting was scheduled after Ed Pechous, a former CIA official employed

by Tamraz, called Heslin "repeatedly" requesting that she meet with Tamraz.⁵² Heslin agreed to meet with Tamraz and scheduled the meeting for June 2, 1995. Heslin testified that before the meeting, she "tasked the interagency [group] to basically check out the representations he had made at the various departments with regard to support from various entities and governments."⁵³ After receiving information from a variety of sources, Heslin discovered that Tamraz's representations "did not check out."⁵⁴

Heslin had a 20-minute meeting with Tamraz and Pechous on June 2, 1995. According to Heslin, she explained U.S. policy and "asked [Tamraz] a bunch of tough questions," including why he had misrepresented his support and whether he was seeking exclusive rights.⁵⁵ Heslin testified that she did not get very satisfactory answers and that Tamraz told her that he was seeking to charge five percent of the overall costs of the deal. Heslin explained that that "was the clincher" against his deal, because such deals were against U.S. policy and were not "economically viable."⁵⁶

Tamraz testified that during this meeting, Heslin was in "listening mode" only, and that she was skeptical of his proposal, as were the other mid-level officials with whom he met in May and June.⁵⁷ According to Tamraz, the mid-level officials during these meetings in the spring of 1995 gave him "the same song."⁵⁸ Tamraz had no other contact with Heslin or the other agency officials after June 1995.⁵⁹

Bob of the CIA

In preparation for her June 2 meeting with Tamraz, Heslin requested information from the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence ("DI"), the CIA division that analyzes information.⁶⁰ Heslin testified that just prior to her meeting, both a colleague at the CIA's DI and an official of the CIA's Directorate of Operations ("DO") -- the CIA division that gathers information, often undercover -- told her that they would be sending her a report.⁶¹ The official from the DO was referred to during Committee proceedings as "Bob of the CIA" in order to protect his undercover identity. Heslin "was very surprised" that the DO would "decide[] on its own" to send a report on Tamraz, when she had not requested one.⁶²

Heslin did receive two separate CIA reports in May 1995, prior to her June 2, 1995 meeting with Tamraz -- one report was from the DI and the other was from the DO. Heslin testified that "there was a very big difference between the reports."⁶³ According to Heslin, the DI report contained negative information about Tamraz, whereas the DO report, signed by Bob's supervisor William Lofgrin, "was almost wholly positive."⁶⁴ Heslin testified that she did not understand this discrepancy.⁶⁵ This CIA pattern of the DO providing positive information about Tamraz to the NSC continued in early June 1995, when Bob began to contact Heslin and promote Tamraz and his pipeline proposal.

Heslin testified that shortly after her June 2 meeting with Tamraz, she received a call from Bob of the CIA. During that call, Bob apologized for the contents of the DO's report, telling Heslin that his boss Lofgrin (who later went to work for Tamraz) had "asked him personally to call [Heslin]

and review his history."⁶⁶

According to Heslin, Bob knew details about her June 2 meeting with Tamraz, and began to "rebut every tough question" she had posed to Tamraz in that meeting.⁶⁷ Heslin testified that Bob "was attempting to essentially provide [her] information to ease [her] concerns on the questions that [she] had raised with Tamraz."⁶⁸ Heslin found this "strange."⁶⁹ Heslin also testified that when talking about Tamraz, Bob had a real reverence in his voice about some of Tamraz's past involvement with the CIA.⁷⁰

Heslin testified that between early June and late October 1995, Bob called her anywhere from three to five times in what she testified could "only be characterized as lobbying in favor of Roger Tamraz."⁷¹ Heslin testified that she was "astonished" when Bob told her specific details about Tamraz's pipeline deal, once even assuring her that the Turkish government was almost "on board."⁷² According to Heslin, Bob never mentioned Tamraz's political contributions, and the evidence establishes that Bob's calls began before Tamraz had begun to contribute to the Democratic Party in July of 1995.⁷³

Sometime in late August or early September 1995, evidence presented to the Committee indicates that Bob also contacted the Vice President's staff to discuss Tamraz.⁷⁴ At this time, Tamraz had requested an official meeting with Vice President Gore and was waiting for a response.⁷⁵

The last telephone call Heslin received from Bob was in mid-October, after the Caspian Sea pipeline project had been signed and U.S. policy had been implemented. During this call, Heslin recalled that once again Bob urged her to support Tamraz's deal, stating that it was important that they "get Tamraz back on board" in the region.⁷⁶

It was also in mid-October 1995 that Bob initiated a telephone call to Donald Fowler, chairman of the DNC. Bob wrote in an October 20, 1995 memorandum provided to the Committee that "[o]n October 19 Don Fowler called me at the behest of . . . Roger Tamraz."⁷⁷ However, during his deposition, portions of which have been declassified, Bob testified that in fact he had called Fowler first. Bob testified that he placed the first call to Fowler on October 18, before Fowler ever contacted him.⁷⁸ Fowler was not in, so Bob left his full name with a young man who answered the phone.⁷⁹

According to Bob, Fowler returned the call the next day.⁸⁰ Fowler testified that he does not have any memory of this phone call, but according to Bob, Fowler told him that he understood that Bob was in contact with the Vice President's office.⁸¹ In response, Bob testified that he informed Fowler that he could not help with a meeting with the Vice President, referring Fowler to an individual inside the Vice President's office.⁸² Bob also testified that the conversation with Fowler was brief, that he was working undercover and that he never mentioned his CIA affiliation.⁸³ Bob also testified that during the call he was "not sure that Fowler [knew] who he [was] talking to."⁸⁴ (Bob and Fowler spoke one more time, in mid-December 1995. These calls are both reviewed fully below.)

Bob's last contact with Heslin was at a dinner for federal and foreign officials in late October 1995. According to Heslin, after this dinner, Bob "insisted" that he drive Heslin home.⁸⁵ During the ride, Bob again stated that he had more important information about Tamraz he wished to share with her. According to Heslin, it was her view by this point was that Bob was nothing more than a lobbyist for Tamraz, and that she did not want any additional information.⁸⁶

Although the majority of Bob's deposition testimony remains classified, it can be generally stated that Bob agreed with Heslin that he was the one who initiated all contacts with Heslin. Bob also testified, however, that contrary to Heslin's testimony, he only provided Heslin with negative information about Tamraz during those calls. Bob's testimony is contrary to Heslin's public testimony before the Committee. Based on Bob's deposition transcript as a whole, the testimony of Heslin, Lofgrin's positive position and the positive DO reports, Bob's assertion that he provided only negative information about Tamraz to Heslin is not credible. Instead, the opposite conclusion is warranted -- that Bob of the CIA lobbied Heslin on behalf of Tamraz and his pipeline project.

In sum, from June 1995 through October 1995, the evidence establishes that Bob, then an employee of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, lobbied the NSC on behalf of Tamraz and his pipeline proposal. The lobbying began in May of 1995, when Bob and his boss Lofgrin decided "on their own" to send a positive report about Tamraz to Heslin. Heslin had not requested this report and found it ultimately to be inaccurate. Bob's lobbying began before Tamraz had made any political contributions to the Democratic Party and there is no evidence that he ever mentioned political contributions to Heslin. Bob's lobbying seemed driven by a desire to promote the idea that the U.S. Government should support Tamraz's pipeline deal. Of significance is the fact that Bob's lobbying ended shortly after Tamraz had been excluded from the pipeline deal in October of 1995.

Although the reasons behind Bob's lobbying are unclear, it is clear that Bob's lobbying was not tied to Tamraz's involvement with either Fowler or the Democratic Party. The Committee did not completely resolve these issues and further investigation of CIA involvement with Tamraz is warranted.

JULY - OCTOBER 1995: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Contribution History

Tamraz testified quite bluntly about his persistence in pursuing his business ventures with top officials in the U.S. government: "[I]f they kicked me from the door, I will come through the window."⁸⁷

Tamraz began to contribute to the Democratic Party in July 1995, after the interagency group had given Tamraz the signal that his pipeline proposal would not gain Administration support. Tamraz's first substantial contribution to the Democratic Party was July 19, 1995 and his last was October 19, 1995.⁸⁸ Committee documents and FEC records show the following contributions by

Tamraz:

July 19, 1995:	\$20,000 to the DNC Federal Account
	\$25,000 to Virginia Democratic Party
	\$25,000 to Louisiana Democratic Party
	\$20,000 to Richard Molpus for Governor of Mississippi
August 29, 1995:	\$ 5,000 to Richard Molpus for Governor of Mississippi
September 10, 1995:	\$50,000 to the DNC (for Tamoil Inc.)
October 19, 1995:	\$75,000 to Virginia Democratic Party
Total:	\$220,000 from July to October 1995

Interestingly, Tamraz made no substantial contributions to the Democratic Party after October 1995, which was the month the contract for the Caspian Sea pipeline was signed. Apparently, the mid-level U.S. officials had stopped Tamraz at the front door in June of 1995, Bob of the CIA was not able to help him, and thereafter Tamraz attempted to "come through the window"⁸⁹ by way of political contributions. Indeed, Tamraz testified that he had made political contributions in order to gain access to the White House and that one reason for seeking access was to promote his pipeline project.⁹⁰ As discussed below, Tamraz's efforts to gain access to higher-level officials and promote his pipeline by way of political contributions met with limited success.

The DNC's Acceptance of Tamraz's Contributions

According to Tamraz, sometime before July 1995, he received a DNC solicitation letter incorrectly addressed to "Robert Tamraz."⁹¹ In response, Tamraz stated that he contacted the DNC to discuss contributions. Documents produced to the Committee show that the DNC prepared a memorandum to Chairman Fowler in anticipation of Fowler meeting with Tamraz to discuss possible contributions.⁹² The memorandum, dated July 12, 1995, was prepared by Alejandra Y. Castillo, a DNC Finance Division employee. The memorandum explained that Tamraz had indicated he would like to give \$300,000, but warned that accepting the contribution may "generate considerable problems for the DNC."⁹³ The memorandum set forth in detail the controversies in Tamraz's past, including the Lebanese embezzlement charges and the Commerce Department's decision to bar Tamraz from participating in certain trade activities. The memorandum even warned Fowler about Tamraz's motivation, stating that "Mr. Tamraz seeks political leverage to secure his oil ventures in the Russian Republics (Caspian Oil Project)." ⁹⁴

The memorandum, which concluded with "Pay attention to these warning signals!", informed Fowler that the "DNC Finance Department is pending [sic] your guidance on whether to continue our conversation with Mr. Tamraz and/or extend an invitation to participate in DNC events."⁹⁵ Fowler thereafter accepted contributions from Tamraz and supported his attendance at a variety of DNC events. While these activities were legal, Fowler's decision to support Tamraz's attendance at DNC events was unwise given the warnings that Tamraz might misuse his attendance at such events.

SEPTEMBER 1995: REQUEST FOR AN OFFICIAL MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT

In August 1995, Haroun Sassounian, a wealthy business associate of Tamraz, requested that the Vice President have an official meeting with him and Tamraz to discuss a Caspian Sea pipeline venture.⁹⁶ Tamraz testified that he never requested this meeting and that Sassounian may have wanted to push his pipeline proposal because it benefitted Armenia.⁹⁷ Nonetheless, the Vice President's staff sought information in order to make a recommendation on whether the Vice President should meet with Tamraz.

Heslin, who worked closely with the Vice President's National Security staff on energy issues, was contacted by Richard Grimes of the Vice President's National Security staff about Sassounian's request.⁹⁸ Heslin provided Grimes with information about Tamraz and recommended against the meeting.⁹⁹ After Grimes consulted with Heslin and other Vice Presidential staff members, Leon Fuerth, the Vice President's national security advisor, sent a memorandum on September 13, 1995 to the Vice President recommending that he not meet with Tamraz.¹⁰⁰ On October 2 and 3, the Vice President's staff notified Sassounian and Tamraz that no official meeting would be scheduled.¹⁰¹

Although Tamraz never had an official meeting with the Vice President, he did attend several DNC-related events where the President or Vice President were in attendance.

TAMRAZ'S ATTENDANCE AT DNC EVENTS

Summary of Events

As discussed above, from 1994 to April 1996, a variety of federal officials opposed Tamraz's efforts to have access to high-level U.S. Government officials. In 1994 and 1995, the Commerce Department twice decided not to support the business ventures of Tamraz or his company. In June 1995, the Caspian Sea pipeline interagency group decided that they would recommend to their superiors that Tamraz not receive access to higher-level federal officials. In September 1995, Fuerth recommended against a Tamraz meeting with the Vice President.¹⁰²

In September and October 1995, Tamraz nonetheless attended three DNC events. On September 11, he attended a Business Council Reception at the White House where 320 people were in attendance; on September 15, he attended a DNC Trustee Dinner at the White House, where 80 people were in attendance; and on October 2, he attended a fundraiser held at a private residence and sat at the head table with Vice President Gore.¹⁰³

After the October fundraiser, the Vice President's staff forwarded Fuerth's memo to the DNC, apparently in an attempt to prevent future contact between Tamraz and the Vice President.¹⁰⁴ Thereafter, Tamraz was disinvited from an October 5, 1995, DNC coffee at the White House.¹⁰⁵

As noted previously, on October 7, 1995, the Caspian Sea pipeline contract was signed, and Tamraz was excluded from the project. Thereafter, according to Heslin's testimony, she was less concerned with Tamraz and his access to the federal government because he was less able to misuse his access to push for his Caspian pipeline deal.¹⁰⁶

After Tamraz was excluded from the project, his contributions to the Democratic Party dwindled. Perhaps in hopes of encouraging more contributions, the DNC invited Tamraz to a series of DNC events beginning on December 13, 1995. He attended a 300-person holiday reception at the White House on December 13, 1995; a 120-person DNC Trustee Dinner on March 27, 1996; a DNC coffee on April 1, 1996 where approximately 15 people were in attendance; and, finally, a showing of a movie at the White House on June 22, 1996 organized by the DNC, where approximately 50 people were in attendance.¹⁰⁷

Tamraz testified that he did not have any substantive conversations with the President or Vice President at these events.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, Tamraz's attendance at these DNC events was contrary to the recommendations of federal officials and was of concern to those involved in the Caspian Sea pipeline project.

Fowler's Role

In early October 1995, after Tamraz was notified that the Vice President had declined to schedule a meeting with him and after he had been disinvited from an October 5, 1995 DNC coffee, Tamraz testified that he had a conversation with Fowler and suggested that Fowler "pick up" information about him, including information from the CIA, in order to clear his name with the White House.¹⁰⁹ Tamraz stated that he gave to Fowler Bob of the CIA's name, most likely both his first and last name, as well as his telephone number.¹¹⁰ Tamraz testified that he also spoke with Bob at this same time, as he often did during his trips to Washington.¹¹¹ In his deposition, Bob confirmed that he spoke to Tamraz in October and testified that Tamraz informed him that Tamraz had given his name and phone numbers to Fowler.¹¹²

On October 18, 1995, Bob of the CIA called Fowler and left a message that he had called.¹¹³ On October 19, 1995, according to Bob of the CIA, Fowler returned his call and the two discussed the issue of Tamraz meeting with the Vice President.¹¹⁴ Bob testified that he told Fowler that he could not assist with setting up any meetings, despite evidence that Bob had already contacted the Vice President's office on Tamraz's behalf.¹¹⁵

Two months later, on December 13, 1995, Fowler called Bob again. According to Bob, Fowler repeated Tamraz's assertions that the NSC was a captive of the oil companies and was unfairly preventing Tamraz from attending DNC events.¹¹⁶ Bob testified that he declined to provide any information to Fowler.¹¹⁷ Bob also testified that during this phone call, like his first phone conversation with Fowler in October, he couldn't "say for certain how [Fowler] knew who he was talking to because CIA was never mentioned."¹¹⁸

According to documents presented to the Committee, Fowler also telephoned Heslin in mid December 1995.¹¹⁹ Heslin testified that this was her first and only phone conversation with Fowler.¹²⁰ During that call, Heslin testified that Fowler told her that she would be receiving information about Tamraz from Bob of the CIA.¹²¹ Heslin complained about the call to her superior, Nancy Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.¹²² Soderberg told the Committee during a staff interview that after talking to Heslin, she spoke to Fowler and told him not to call NSC staff.¹²³

After talking to Fowler, Soderberg told the Committee that she decided to check up on Tamraz herself. Soderberg and Heslin stated that, as Heslin sat in Soderberg's office, Soderberg called Randy Beers, senior director of intelligence at the NSC, and asked him to find out about Tamraz and his relationship with the CIA.¹²⁴ Beers told the Committee that he subsequently requested information from the CIA regarding Tamraz.¹²⁵ On December 29, 1995, the CIA faxed to Beer's assistant a report containing information about Tamraz.¹²⁶

The December 1995 report was the third report that the CIA had sent to the NSC regarding Tamraz. The first two reports were sent to Heslin in May 1995 to prepare her for her June 2 meeting with Tamraz (one from the CIA's DI and the other from the CIA's DO). The third report, although using the same format as the reports in May, was faxed by the CIA directly to Beers's office in late December 1995.

The Committee investigated whether it was Fowler who had influenced the CIA's decision to send a third report to the NSC and whether Fowler had any influence on the contents of that report. These issues arose because Fowler had contacted Bob in mid December before the report was sent, and because the report contained only positive information about Tamraz. It does not appear, however, that the CIA sent its third report in December in response to Fowler's call to Bob. Because the report was sent to Beers's office directly, following Beer's request to the CIA for information on Tamraz, it is more likely that the CIA sent the report in response to a request from Beers, not Fowler. It also does not appear that Fowler had any influence on the contents of the report. The third CIA report was drafted by Bob of the CIA, who had already sent a report to Heslin in May 1995 that, according to Heslin, had "wholly positive" information regarding Tamraz. Thus, it is no surprise, based on Bob's first report, as well as on Bob's promotion of Tamraz during calls to Heslin, that Bob's report in December contained only positive information about Tamraz. The Committee was also informed that the third report may have contained only positive information due to appropriate internal legal restrictions within the CIA itself. Fowler's contact with Bob was unwise although he testified that he could not remember telephone calls with anyone at the CIA.¹²⁷

No Effect on Policy

Although Tamraz's political contributions to the Democratic Party afforded him limited access to the President and Vice President, U.S. policy toward the Caspian Sea pipeline project was not affected by either Tamraz's contributions or his access. Indeed, when Tamraz was asked whether he regretted making his contributions to the Democratic Party, which totalled less than \$300,000,

Tamraz responded that “I think next time, I’ll give 600,00.”¹²⁸

APRIL 1996: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICIAL TALKS TO HESLIN

Tamraz’s Attendance at March 27 and April 1, 1996 DNC Events

On March 27, 1996, Tamraz attended a DNC Trustee Dinner at the White House along with 120 other guests.¹²⁹ Tamraz testified that during a brief “introduction to the President,” he mentioned his pipeline project, but according to Tamraz, the President’s reaction was to respond that he would “like to see jobs coming to America.”¹³⁰ Tamraz also testified that he told the President that “if somebody wants to hear me out, I’m available.”¹³¹ At that same event, Tamraz testified that he also spoke to Thomas F. McLarty, Counselor to the President and Special Envoy for the Americas, in a reception line and, in very brief exchange, the two discussed the oil industry in general.¹³² According to McLarty, Tamraz talked about his pipeline project and then the two discussed more generally “the importance of lessening the U.S. dependence on the Middle East for energy supplies, something that [McLarty] felt very strongly about for a number of years and conveyed on a number of occasions to the President and others.”¹³³

During this dinner, Ann Stock, a social secretary at the White House, made notes about some of the President’s conversations that evening. In a memorandum to the President the next day, March 28, Stock mentioned the President’s brief conversation with Tamraz, writing that Tamraz “wanted to discuss the pipeline that will go from the Caspian Sea to Turkey. You told him that someone would follow-up with him. He will be at the 4/1 breakfast.”¹³⁴ The President wrote on the memo: “Does Azer. Gov’t want this” and “cc M McLarty.”¹³⁵ Based on the President’s notations, McLarty understood that he was being asked to obtain information about the pipeline proposal.¹³⁶

On April 1, McLarty and Tamraz attended a breakfast/coffee at the White House, along with approximately 13 other guests.¹³⁷ Tamraz testified that he spoke to McLarty “for about 30 seconds before we sat down”¹³⁸ and gave him a brochure from his company and business card.¹³⁹ Tamraz said he did not expect to hear back from McLarty, but again told McLarty that “[i]f anybody is interested to talk to me about it, I’m available.”¹⁴⁰ McLarty testified that he recalled attending the coffee and seeing Tamraz, but did not recall this brief exchange.¹⁴¹

Follow-Up on the Pipeline Project

Between March 27 and April 1, records indicated that McLarty sent a fax to Kyle Simpson, a senior advisor at the Energy Department.¹⁴² McLarty and Simpson both told the Committee that McLarty often contacted Simpson when he needed information about energy issues, and that the two had frequent contact with each other.¹⁴³ The Committee does not have a copy of this fax, but McLarty testified that it “probably was just a brief note [on the pipeline project] asking for information or telling Kyle [Simpson] I would call him.”¹⁴⁴

Pursuant to Stock’s March 28 memorandum, McLarty also sent brief notes to both the

President and Simpson on April 2, 1996. To the President, he noted that he had seen Tamraz at the April 1 coffee and would follow up with him “in a supportive but prudent and appropriate way.”¹⁴⁵ To Simpson, he faxed Tamraz’s brochure and business card and wrote “Please review and let’s discuss the attached. (Relates to the fax I sent you last week.)”¹⁴⁶

Shortly thereafter, McLarty and Simpson talked on the telephone. Both testified that McLarty requested information about Tamraz’s pipeline proposal. Specifically, McLarty testified that he called Simpson “to inquire about the pipeline project. That was the assignment I had been given.”¹⁴⁷ Simpson also testified that McLarty wanted information about the “pipeline project.”¹⁴⁸ Thus, after the President and McLarty had brief exchanges with Tamraz at DNC events, McLarty was asked by the President to find out whether there was any merit to the pipeline proposal that Tamraz claimed would bring peace to the region and jobs to Americans. Simpson explained generally that the U.S. Government often seeks this type of information because the Government sees value in U.S. companies building and owning projects outside the U.S., although the Government is “not terribly particular” about which U.S. company it is if more than one is vying for a project.¹⁴⁹

McLarty and Simpson both testified that when McLarty requested information about the Caspian Sea pipeline proposal, McLarty did not mention the issue of whether Tamraz should have a meeting with the President.¹⁵⁰ In fact, Simpson’s testimony reveals that he thought that Tamraz had already met with the President. He stated in his deposition that McLarty called and “said the President had met with Mr. Tamraz and Mr. Tamraz had talked about his pipeline proposal and he . . . asked Mr. McLarty to find out” if the pipeline was important.¹⁵¹

It is also significant that the testimony establishes that McLarty’s conversation with Simpson did not involve a discussion of political contributions. McLarty and Simpson testified in their depositions that not only did they not discuss political contributions, but that neither of them knew anything about Tamraz’s contributions at that time.¹⁵² Tamraz himself testified that he never discussed political contributions with McLarty or Simpson and, in fact, noted that “nobody at the White House has ever talked to me about contributions, ever.”¹⁵³

The Request within the Department of Energy

Shortly after he received the call from McLarty, Simpson was approached after an Energy Department staff meeting sometime in early April 1996 by John “Jack” Carter, also a senior policy advisor at the Energy Department.¹⁵⁴ Carter had been a Department of Energy representative on the interagency group chaired by Heslin and was one of the mid-level officials who met with Tamraz in the spring of 1995. Simpson testified that during this brief exchange, the issue of Tamraz arose. Simpson testified that he explained to Carter that he was seeking information on Tamraz’s pipeline project and asked Carter to tell him “what’s going on with this pipeline.”¹⁵⁵ He also testified that he most likely conveyed to Carter that the request had come from McLarty.¹⁵⁶ Simpson testified that he did not mention anything about political contributions,¹⁵⁷ nor did he ask Carter to contact anyone in particular about this request.¹⁵⁸

This exchange between Simpson and Carter was, by both of their accounts, brief and informal. In fact, Carter testified that his only knowledge “about Mr. McLarty’s inquiry was from [this] brief conversation with Kyle Simpson on April 3rd, 1996.”¹⁵⁹ Based on this “brief conversation,” however, Carter testified that he thought that Simpson asked about a Presidential meeting.¹⁶⁰ Carter also said that he “thought” that he saw “handwritten notes” with numbers on them, stating that “there was a pad with some notes on it. . . . I can’t remember distinctly. It might have had some numbers on it. I am just not sure.”¹⁶¹ Finally, Carter testified that Simpson, “either on the pad or mentioned that the fellow had made a contribution, was going to make more contributions apparently to somebody, political contributions.”¹⁶² Simpson, however, testified that he was not aware of Tamraz’s political contributions and did not mention anything about political contributions during this conversation.¹⁶³

Carter also testified, however, that although he thought contributions were mentioned during this conversation, Simpson did not suggest to him that anyone thought that Tamraz should meet with the President because of Tamraz’s political contributions.¹⁶⁴ In fact, Carter testified that, during this brief exchange, he immediately told Simpson that he was aware of Tamraz’s efforts in the Caspian Sea region, and that the President should have nothing to do with him.¹⁶⁵ However, Carter testified that he offered to call Heslin and determine if there was an update regarding Tamraz’s pipeline proposal.¹⁶⁶ Carter agreed that it was his suggestion to call Heslin and that no one had suggested that he do so.¹⁶⁷

Based on this brief conversation, Carter called Heslin the next day.¹⁶⁸ Carter testified that his only purpose in calling Heslin was to see whether the policy about the Tamraz project had changed.¹⁶⁹

Carter’s Call to Heslin

Heslin’s Testimony

Carter called Heslin on April 4, 1996. At that time, according to Heslin, Carter was a colleague with whom she had worked for a year and who she knew was looking for a job in the White House.¹⁷⁰ She also testified that by April of 1996, she was not actively working on the Caspian Sea pipeline policy, but was instead “simply monitoring and supporting the technical implementation of the deal that had been agreed [to] in October.”¹⁷¹

Heslin testified that Carter began the phone conversation in early April by saying that he was calling “at the behest of Mack McLarty who had recently met with Roger Tamraz and really liked his pipeline proposal.”¹⁷² Heslin then stated that Carter asserted that McLarty wanted Tamraz to have a meeting with the President and that it “would mean a lot of money for the DNC.”¹⁷³ According to Heslin, Carter also told her that Tamraz had already given \$ 200,000 and if he got a meeting with the President, he would give another \$ 400,000. Heslin stated that Carter then asserted that both McLarty and the President wanted this.¹⁷⁴ Heslin testified that she doubted some of Carter’s statements, and told him “this is just unbelievable. . . . I can’t believe that, Jack.”¹⁷⁵ When Heslin resisted the idea of a meeting, Heslin said that Carter “was pretty aggressive” and warned her that

she shouldn't be "such a Girl Scout." Heslin also testified that Carter warned her that McLarty might become Secretary of the Energy Department, implying that if she resisted this request, her long-term career in the energy field might suffer.¹⁷⁶ Heslin testified that the phone call lasted about 25 minutes.¹⁷⁷

Carter's Testimony

Carter's recollection of the phone call was different than Heslin's. Carter testified that he called Heslin to see "[i]f there had been any change in our policy, or view towards Tamraz, and whether there was any reason the President should meet with Tamraz."¹⁷⁸ He said that he remembered the call lasting only three to five minutes, and that during that time, he did not state that the President or McLarty wanted a meeting, nor that McLarty might become Secretary of Energy.¹⁷⁹ Carter also testified in his deposition that he did not call Heslin a Girl Scout, although at the public hearing, he testified that he may have.¹⁸⁰ Although Carter remembered mentioning political contributions to Heslin, he testified that he did not tie the contributions to a meeting with the President.¹⁸¹ In sum, Carter testified that "I would not try to bring any pressure on Sheila Heslin having to do with political matters. Moreover, I wouldn't do it with something that I opposed, which was a meeting with Tamraz and the President."¹⁸²

Carter recognized, however, based on Heslin's public testimony the day before, that she had felt pressure during the call. He stated that at the time of the call, it hadn't "register[ed]" with him that he was pressuring her.¹⁸³ Carter's explanation for their different recollections was that Heslin "read more into it certainly than I ever intended because there was no intention of mine to pressure her in any way."¹⁸⁴

Carter's testimony also reveals that he was in no position to speak on behalf of McLarty, let alone the President. Carter testified that he had never spoken to McLarty about this particular request and, in fact, never worked closely with McLarty on anything. For example, in his two years at the Energy Department, Carter only talked to McLarty four or five times on the telephone about energy issues and never met with him in his office.¹⁸⁵ Carter also testified that he had a total of two personal conversations with McLarty, during which he inquired about jobs at the White House, in an attempt "to get a little more visibility in the administration."¹⁸⁶ In early 1996, Carter testified that McLarty informed him that he would not be hired.¹⁸⁷

Carter was, however, familiar with Heslin and Tamraz. He had been a member of the interagency group on Caspian Sea policy and had traveled with Heslin and other officials to the region in 1995. In May of that year, Carter was one of the mid-level officials who met with Tamraz about his pipeline proposal, and was opposed to it. However, unlike Heslin, Carter thought that in the scheme of things, Tamraz "was not an important factor" in the region.¹⁸⁸ After October 1995, when the pipeline agreement was signed, Carter had little contact with Heslin.

The Department of Energy Responds to the Request for Information

After his call to Heslin, Carter testified that he reported back to Simpson that the Tamraz's pipeline proposal did not have merit and that the NSC had further information if McLarty wanted to pursue the matter.¹⁸⁹ Simpson testified that he recalled conveying this information to McLarty, and an April 8, 1996, telephone message from him to McLarty contains the information.¹⁹⁰ McLarty remembered Simpson conveying that the pipeline proposal did not have "any uniqueness about it; there was nothing else that needed to be done that was not already being done, and he did raise, as I remember, . . . some caution flag about Mr. Tamraz."¹⁹¹ McLarty testified that, after receiving this information from Simpson, he believes he orally conveyed it to the President.¹⁹² The officials had no further contact with Tamraz after April 1996.¹⁹³

Conclusions

The evidence presented to the Committee establishes that in late March 1996, Tamraz caught the President's ear at a DNC function and told him that he was working on a supposedly important peace pipeline proposal in the Caspian Sea region that would bring jobs to Americans. The next day, the President wrote "cc'd McLarty" and "does the Azerb. Gov't want this" on a memorandum from his social secretary. McLarty understood this notation as a request to inquire about the merits of Tamraz's pipeline proposal. On April 1, McLarty met Tamraz briefly at a coffee, where he obtained Tamraz's business brochure.

McLarty faxed the brochure to Simpson, his usual contact at the Energy Department, and asked for information about Tamraz's pipeline project. After an April 3 staff meeting within the Energy Department, Carter and Simpson spoke briefly and the issue of Tamraz and his pipeline arose. Simpson told Carter during this exchange that McLarty had asked for information about Tamraz's pipeline project. Carter offered to call Heslin to respond to McLarty's request. The Minority believes, however, that Carter did not accurately understand -- or did not accurately testify to -- his brief exchange with Simpson. Carter's testimony about the exchange, which he described as Simpson posing a question whether Tamraz should meet with the President, and some mention of political contributions, is full of "maybe's" and "I don't remember distinctly's" and "I thought's." In contrast, Simpson and McLarty's testimony about the request, which was for information about Tamraz's pipeline proposal, is straightforward and follows logically from the President's notation on the March 28 memorandum asking about the pipeline. In his eagerness to respond to McLarty, Carter likely assumed that the request was for a meeting between Tamraz and the President, which would have been a logical assumption based on Carter's experience with the interagency group, where the subject of Tamraz and his attempts to meet with government officials had often been discussed.

There is evidence that Carter also likely wanted to respond to this request from McLarty in order to gain higher visibility in the Administration, something he testified he was seeking at that time. Additionally, Carter probably did not obtain the contribution figures he conveyed to Heslin from Simpson. The figure of \$200,000 of past contributions by Tamraz was generally correct, but had been reported in the energy community and discussed in the interagency task force meetings.¹⁹⁴ In addition, press reports on Tamraz's political contributions were found in files of both Department of Energy and NSC officials, including Heslin. The second figure Carter purportedly conveyed to Heslin

was that Tamraz was prepared to contribute an additional \$400,000 to the DNC. That figure is not correct, nor had Tamraz promised to contribute more money at that time.¹⁹⁵ Tamraz's last substantial contribution had been many months before, in October of 1995. Furthermore, Simpson and McLarty both testified unequivocally that political contributions and a potential meeting with the President were never discussed in relation to their request for information about Tamraz's pipeline proposal. In sum, Carter's testimony that Simpson mentioned political contributions or a meeting with the President is subject to question. Rather, it is likely that Carter assumed that a meeting was requested and determined on his own to aggressively respond to a request he had misunderstood.¹⁹⁶

Carter's testimony in that regard is also subject to additional scrutiny because of contradictions between his testimony and that of Heslin's regarding their phone conversation. Carter stated that he called Heslin only to ask her whether there had been a change in policy that would permit a meeting between the President and Tamraz. Carter testified that he never spoke to McLarty about the request, never intended to pressure Heslin to agree to a meeting based on political contributions, and never chastised her with names or warnings about her future career in the energy field. Heslin, however, testified that Carter invoked the names of McLarty and the President, did pressure her based on political contributions, and called her a Girl Scout and warned about McLarty becoming Secretary of Energy.¹⁹⁷

In the Minority's view, the evidence strongly supports a conclusion that Carter acted on his own in making certain statements to Heslin during their phone call, and that he did so inappropriately. In fact, Heslin's supervisor Nancy Soderberg came to this very conclusion when Heslin informed her about the telephone call.¹⁹⁸ Carter likely thought he could win visibility in the Administration by putting some pressure on a friend, and, when she resisted, he dropped the matter. Heslin also probably reacted particularly strongly because she had already been contacted about Tamraz by Bob of the CIA several times, and Fowler once.

CONCLUSION: ACCESS STILL FOR SALE IN 1997

In February 1997, Tamraz received letters from Republican Senators Trent Lott and Mitch McConnell inviting him to become a member of the Senatorial Inner Circle.¹⁹⁹ Senator Lott encouraged Tamraz to join the Inner Circle, stating, "I know you will enjoy meeting my Senate colleagues . . . at the meetings we have scheduled this year." Senator McConnell was more specific. His letter stated that for a contribution to the Republican Party, Tamraz could discuss high-level policy issues at exclusive dinners with the Senate leadership.

Tamraz attempted to take up this offer of access, but his contribution was returned. When asked why he had contributed this time, Tamraz responded, "you set the rules, and we are following the rules. . . . [T]his is politics as usual. What is new?"²⁰⁰ In reply, Senator Carl Levin summarized the story of Tamraz:

"I think that is exactly the point. . . . I just hope our colleagues will closely follow these hearings, enough so that we can vote to change politics as usual because that

is exactly what the problem is. It is politics as usual."²⁰¹

1. Depositions were taken of Roger Tamraz, John “Jack” Carter, Kyle Simpson, Thomas McLarty, Donald Fowler, Bob of the CIA, and several Department of Commerce officials. Interviews were conducted of a variety of NSC employees, including Samuel “Sandy” Berger, Sheila Heslin, Nancy Soderberg, Robert Suettinger, Randy Beers, Jamona Broadway, and Melanie Darby. Documents were produced by Tamraz, the Department of Commerce, the White House, the NSC, the CIA, the State Department, and the DNC. Public testimony was taken of Heslin, Tamraz, Carter and Simpson during Committee’s hearings held on September 17 and 18, 1997.
2. Fortune magazine, 11/73.
3. Fortune magazine, 11/73.
4. See also Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 135-36 (discussion of Fortune magazine article and Tamraz’s role in the 1973 pipeline deal).
5. Washington Post, 9/9/97.
6. New York Times, 5/4/78; Newsweek, 2/10/75.
7. Newsweek, 2/10/75.
8. Newsweek, 2/10/75.
9. Newsweek, 2/10/75.
10. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 11-13; Washington Post, 9/9/97.
11. Washington Post, 9/9/97.
12. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 11-14.
13. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 3 & 12.
14. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 4; Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 123-24 ; Washington Post, 9/9/97.
15. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 3-4; Washington Post, 9/9/97. According to Tamraz, the U.S. also asked him to arrange for the safe passage into Lebanon of William Buckley, who was sent in to negotiate the release of American hostages. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 4. For additional information, see New York Times, 12/12/86, 12/11/86, 9/7/80; Washington Post, 12/11/86; Los Angeles Times, 12/12/86; Chemical Week, 4/11/79.
16. Tamraz testified that he had a pattern of hiring former CIA agents. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 42.

17. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 36. Tamraz asserts that he was a permanent resident in the United States since 1967 and became a U.S. citizen in 1989, Statement of Roger Tamraz, 5/13/97, thus making him eligible to contribute to the RNC in 1985.
18. Congressional Quarterly, 8/20/97; see also public FEC records.
19. Congressional Quarterly, 8/20/97; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 65.
20. Staff Interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
21. Exhibit 1064M: p. 1, Letter from Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr. to Robert Tuttle, Special Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel, 6/25/85.
22. Exhibit 1064M: p. 1, Letter from Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr. to Robert Tuttle, Special Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel, 6/25/85.
23. Exhibit 1064M: p. 2, Letter from Robert H. Tuttle, director of presidential personnel to Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., chairman of the RNC, 7/10/85.
24. Senator Levin, 9/18/97, Hrg., pp. 64-66 (discussing Frank Fahrenkopf's letter to the Committee regarding Roger Tamraz).
25. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 4-6; Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 8-10; Washington Post, 9/19/97.
26. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 4-6; Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 8-10; Washington Post, 9/19/97.
27. Roger Tamraz, 9/19/97 Hrg., pp. 4-6; DNC 3234854-58 (Three articles describing the events found in DNC files: Financial Times, 9/13/89; AP, 3/11/89; Reuters, 3/10/89).
28. Roger Tamraz, 9/19/97 Hrg., pp. 5-6. In 1989, Tamraz was portrayed in the Lebanese media as an agent of Israel. Beirut Newspaper, 1/1/89; Roger Tamraz, 9/19/97 Hrg., p. 5.
29. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 5.
30. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 5.
31. Department of Commerce Memorandum from Interpol, 4/11/97.
32. Application submitted to Melissa Moss, director of Office of Business Liaison at Commerce, 3/1/94.
33. Melissa Moss deposition, 6/11/97, pp. 190-93.

34. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 5-9. Tamraz admitted that if "anyone puts my name in Nexus-Lexus [sic], you get a lot of horror stories. So I think it was justifiable, but they could have given me a chance to explain the circumstances." Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 6.

35. A series of memoranda circulated between the Commerce Department in Washington and the Commercial Service office in Hungary reveal that in October 1995, Commerce had once again reviewed Tamraz's questionable background and other issues concerning Oil Capital and determined that the U.S. should not advocate on behalf of Oil Capital. Memorandum from Jonathan Marks to Ann Ngo, 10/25/95; e-mail from Ira Sockowitz to Jonathan Marks, 10/27/95; e-mail from Jonathan Marks to Ira Sockowitz, 11/2/95.

36. Statement of Lanny J. Davis, 6/3/97; Federal Clearinghouse (FDCH); FDCH Political Transcripts, 11/26/97.

37. On February 2, 1995, Platt's Oilgram quoted an administration official as saying, "we support multiple routes." On February 24, 1995, a senior State Department official said that "in the short-run there should be a variety of viable alternatives, and that in the medium-to-long-run the resource based in the region should support pipelines." State Department press guidance on February 3, 1995 noted that "we expect eventual production in the Caspian region to require multiple pipelines." A March 9, 1995 State Department message stated that "the USG still believes multiple routes are necessary and that their development will provide additional security for oil companies as they proceed. To this day, the U.S. has not taken a position on which route the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline should take. The U.S. maintains that the routes chosen is a decision for private companies and should be based on commercial principle, non-discriminatory access, and market-based tariffs. And in May 1995, President Clinton delivered a letter to Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev. President Clinton wrote in the letter that "[t]he U.S. will work actively with Azerbaijan, other governments in the region, the international financial institutions, and private companies to support the development and export of the Caspian Sea's vast energy reserves. Over the next several months, it will be important to ensure that early oil can be exported reliably and economically to the West."

38. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 4, 49-50.

39. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 4; 50-51.

40. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 51; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.

41. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 6.

42. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.

43. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 10.

44. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 8.

45. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 7.
46. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
47. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 52; see also pp. 5-6, 19-20, 72.
48. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 5-6, 19-20, 50-51, 72; Senator Lieberman, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 75.
49. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 22-28.
50. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 44-47. Tamraz first met with the DNC to discuss donations in July of 1995. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 15. Tamraz began contributing to the Democratic Party on July 19, 1995. A DNC Memorandum to Tamraz from Richard Sullivan of the DNC, dated March 28, 1996, states that Tamraz's contributions began on July 19, 1995 and ended on September 10, 1995. Exhibit 1168.
51. See Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 25-26; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 45-48.
52. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 7; 53.
53. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 8.
54. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 8, 33.
55. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 9-10.
56. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 10-11.
57. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 26-28.
58. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 28.
59. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 28; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/98 Hrg., p. 47-48; John Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 155; Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 53-54; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
60. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 54.
61. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 54; 56.
62. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 54.
63. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 54-55.
64. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 54-55; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.

65. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97, Hrg., pp. 55-57; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
66. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 12.
67. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 12.
68. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 57.
69. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 12.
70. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 57-58; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
71. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 20.
72. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 58-59.
73. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 60.
74. Four pieces of evidence support this conclusion. In a Committee interview, Heslin stated that it was her understanding that Bob had also contacted someone in the Vice President's office to lobby for Tamraz, and that she thought it might have been Dana Marshall. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97. Supporting Heslin's statement are two e-mails produced to the Committee by the Vice President's office. The first e-mail, dated September 6, 1995, was sent by Richard Grimes of the Vice President's office to Leon Fuerth, the Vice President's National Security Advisor. The e-mail discusses Tamraz's request for a meeting and sets forth negative information about Tamraz. Grimes had obtained this information about Tamraz from Heslin. Dana Marshall was copied on the e-mail. Exhibit 1124, EOP 56535. The second e-mail is the one Marshall sent in response to Grimes's e-mail about Tamraz. Marshall replied, "Let's discuss this, in light of my discussion with the individual I mentioned." 9/6/95 e-mail from Richard Grimes to Leon Fuerth, EOP 56538. Marshall's response e-mail concerning "the individual" he spoke to about Tamraz, worded in such a secretive manner, suggests that Heslin was correct -- Bob had called Marshall of the Vice President's office to discuss Tamraz. The fourth piece of information supporting this conclusion is a declassified memorandum dated 10/20/95, written by Bob himself. Bob stated that during a conversation with Donald Fowler, chairman of the DNC, "Fowler said he understood that I was in contact with the Vice President's office concerning Tamraz." Memorandum for the Record, written by Bob of the CIA, dated 10/20/95 and produced in declassified form by the CIA. (The contacts between Bob and Fowler are reviewed more fully below.)

Although the evidence does not definitely establish that Bob lobbied the Vice President's office on behalf of Tamraz, largely because the Committee never interviewed or deposed Grimes or Marshall, it appears that Bob did in fact contact

Vice President staff employee Marshall in August or early September 1995 to discuss Tamraz's request to meet with Vice President Gore.

75. Exhibit 1127: Memorandum to the Vice President from Leon Fuerth, 9/13/95, EOP 45766-67.

76. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.

77. Memorandum for the Record, written by Bob of the CIA, produced in declassified form by the CIA, 10/20/95.

78. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 3.

79. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 3.

80. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, pp. 4-5.

81. Memorandum for the Record, written by Bob of the CIA, produced in declassified form by the CIA, 10/20/95.

82. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 7.

83. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 6.

84. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 6.

85. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.

86. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.

87. Roger Tamraz, 9/19/97 Hrg., p. 66.

88. Exhibit 1168; FEC records demonstrate that Tamraz's only other contribution was \$2,000 in September of 1996 for tickets to the DNC Presidential Gala held at the Radio City Music Hall in New York City.

89. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 66.

90. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97, Hrg. pp. 81-83.

91. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 36-37.

92. Exhibit 1117: Memorandum to Fowler from Alejandra Y. Castillo, 7/12/95, DNC 3116351-53.

93. Exhibit 1117: Memorandum to Fowler from Alejandra Y. Castillo, 7/12/95, DNC 3116351-53.
94. Exhibit 1117: Memorandum to Fowler from Alejandra Y. Castillo, 7/12/95, DNC 3116351-53.
95. Exhibit 1117: Memorandum to Fowler from Alejandra Y. Castillo, 7/12/95, DNC 3116351-53.
96. EOP 56535, EOP 56539-40. Sassounian made this request at a DNC breakfast on 8/8/97.
97. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 53-54.
98. E-mail from Grimes to Heslin, 8/11/95, EOP 56532.
99. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97; Exhibit 1200: Heslin notes from conversations with Grimes, EOP 25068; Grimes e-mail to Fuerth discussing information received from Heslin, 6/6/95, EOP 56535.
100. Exhibit 1127: Memorandum to the Vice President from Leon Fuerth, 9/13/95, EOP 45766-67.
101. Handwritten notes from Scott Patrick to Jack Quinn regarding Tamraz saying "hasn't been regretted" and "NSA said no," 10/2/95, EOP 25006-007; Notations on same page say "10/2 - left msg" and "10/3 - left msg.", EOP 25004; Exhibit 1135: Memorandum to Jack Quinn and Kim Tilley from Richard Grimes, 10/2/95, attaching copy of Fuerth's 9/13/95 Memorandum to the Vice President.
102. Also in September 1995, Heslin checked the President's schedule for that month and was informed that no meeting with Tamraz was scheduled. Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
103. Exhibit 1136: Schedule for Vice President Al Gore, 10/2/95, EOP 63857-68
104. Exhibit 1137; EOP 045764-67; Fax to Richard Sullivan of the DNC from the Office of the Vice President dated 10/3/95.
105. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 34-35.
106. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 20, 51-53.
107. Statement of Lanny J. Davis, 3/3/97; EOP 024911-14 (White House WAVES records for Tamraz).

108. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 22-24. Tamraz also told CBS's Rita Braver that "Maybe once, standing in line I said, 'I'm working on a pipeline and that it's going to bring a half million jobs to Americans' and he said 'Good for you. Good luck,' and that's about it." CBS Television Broadcast, 3/17/97. Tamraz told NBC "There was never any one-on-one, it was with many other donors and you never had more than 30 seconds with the President." NBC television broadcast 3/17/97. Both interviews were reported in Hotline, 3/18/97.

109. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 17-18.

110. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 18, 22, 55. Fowler never told Tamraz, however, that he had contacted Bob. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 21; Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 65; Tamraz also doesn't recall Bob telling him that Bob had ever spoken to Fowler. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 65.

111. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, pp. 59-60, 63-64.

112. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 2.

113. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, pp. 3-4, 16-17.

114. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, pp. 7, 17-19.

115. See endnote 74

116. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 11.

117. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 10-11.

118. Bob of the CIA deposition, 7/11/97, p. 11.

119. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 23.

120. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 23, 60.

121. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 23.

122. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 24.

123. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 26-27; Staff interview with Nancy Soderberg, 5/30/97; Donald Fowler deposition, 5/21/97, p. 230.

124. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 63-64; Exhibit 1159: E-mail from Soderberg's assistant, Kenneth Baldwin, to Beers, 12/21/97, EOP 056543; Staff interview with Nancy Soderberg, 5/30/97; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin,

5/28/97; Staff interview with Randy Beers, 5/23/97 and 6/13/97.

125. Staff interview with Randy Beers, Senior Director for Intelligence, NSC, 5/23/97 and 6/13/97.

126. The CIA report faxed to Randy Beers, NSC's Senior Director of Intelligence, on December 29, 1995 is lodged in the Office of Senate Security.

127. Don Fowler deposition, 5/21/87, p. 229.

128. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97, Hrg. p. 86. Senator Lieberman asked Tamraz whether he felt "badly about having given the 300,000." FEC records indicate that Tamraz gave \$220,000 to the Democratic Party from July to October, 1995.

129. Exhibit 1164: 3/27/96 DNC Trustee Dinner invitation acceptance report, 10/20/96, EOP 031249-54.

130. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 22-23.

131. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 24.

132. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 24, 28.

133. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 28-29.

134. Exhibit 1165: Memorandum from Ann Stock to the President, 3/28/96, EOP 046305.

135. Exhibit 1166: Memorandum from Ann Stock to the President, 3/28/96, with notations, EOP 046305.

136. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 56.

137. Exhibit 1170: DNC Memorandum re 4/1/96 coffee, 3/29/96; Exhibit 1171: List of 4/1/96 coffee attendees.

138. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 25.

139. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 27.

140. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 27.

141. Thomas F. McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 44.

142. Exhibit 1174: Memorandum from Mack McLarty to Kyle Simpson stating, "Relates to the fax I sent you last week," 4/2/96, EOP 024980-81.

143. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 42-43; Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 26.
144. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 39.
145. Exhibit 1173: Memorandum from Mack McLarty to the President, 4/2/96, EOP 041537; Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 50-51.
146. Exhibit 1174: Memorandum from Mack McLarty to Kyle Simpson, 4/2/96, EOP 024980-81.
147. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 56.
148. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 43-48; Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 49-51.
149. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 54.
150. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 43, 46-48; Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 50; Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 60.
151. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 43.
152. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 30, 56-57; Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 50-51; Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 43, 46-48.
153. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 73. On March 28, Tamraz received two memoranda from the DNC which he had been requesting for months. Exhibit 1167: Memorandum from Richard Sullivan and Ari Swiller to Roger Tamraz, 3/28/96, DNC 3116355; Exhibit 1168: Memorandum from Richard Sullivan and Ari Swiller to Roger Tamraz, 3/28/96, DNC 3116354. The memoranda list Tamraz's political contributions to date, one adding up to \$300,000, the other adding up to \$205,000. Tamraz testified that he had requested these memoranda for his records and never showed them to anyone. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 73. Simpson and another Energy Department official, John Carter, all testified that they had not seen the document until preparing for depositions in 1997. Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97, Hrg., p. 50; John Carter, 9/18/97, Hrg., p. 32. McLarty testified that he had no knowledge of Tamraz's political contributions at the time. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, p. 30.
154. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 29-30; Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 44.
155. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 57.
156. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 55; Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97, Hrg., p. 52.
157. Kyle Simpson, Hrg., pp. 74-75, 91; Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 55-57; See also endnote 149.
158. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, p. 55-57.

159. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 60, 48.
160. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 30; 35; Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 44-45.
161. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 44-45.
162. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 45.
163. Kyle Simpson, Hrg., pp. 74-75, 91; Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 55-57.
164. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 31-32, 36-37; John Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 79.
165. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 30.
166. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 30.
167. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 130-31.
168. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 28-29.
169. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 30, 33, 37.
170. Sheila Heslin, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 28, 44.
171. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 28.
172. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 29.
173. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 29.
174. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 29-30.
175. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., p. 46.
176. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 30, 47; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97.
177. Sheila Heslin, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 31, 42.
178. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 45.
179. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 60-63; Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 126-27.
180. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 64; Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 125-26.
181. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 79.
182. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 92.

183. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 37.
184. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 93.
185. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 19-20.
186. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, pp. 20-21.
187. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 21.
188. Jack Carter deposition, 6/23/97, p. 42.
189. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 59-60.
190. Kyle Simpson deposition, 6/25/97, pp. 62-63; Exhibit 1182: Phone message slip, EOP 024962.
191. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 62-63.
192. Thomas McLarty deposition, 6/30/97, pp. 67-69.
193. Roger Tamraz deposition, 5/13/97, p. 28; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 47-48; John Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 155; Kyle Simpson, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 53-54; Staff interview with Sheila Heslin, 5/28/97; Thomas McLarty deposition 6/30/97, p. 72.
194. Jack Carter, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 33.
195. Hearing Exhibit 1158; Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97, Hrg., p. 51.
196. Senator Domenici concluded after a morning of testimony that he believed that Carter was telling the truth about this exchange with Simpson, and that Simpson was not being truthful. Senator Domenici, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 101-02. This conclusion, however, is not supported by the record. It is quite clear that Carter's testimony was faulty on every count - it contradicts the sworn testimony of not only Simpson and McLarty, but also of Heslin. Considering that Heslin apparently was found by the Majority and Minority to be a highly credible witness, it is relevant that it is Carter's testimony that directly and specifically contradicts Heslin's.
- If Heslin's testimony was accurate regarding her telephone call with Carter, then it is necessary to conclude that Carter's testimony was not accurate. Thus, if Carter's testimony about his phone call with Heslin is not accurate, it is difficult to argue that Carter's version of his brief conversation with Simpson is accurate, particularly when it is also contradicted by two individuals.
197. During her public testimony, Heslin speculated that Carter acted in this manner because he was acting on the behalf of someone else. However, this speculation is contradicted by the evidence before the Committee. For example, Carter himself testified that he was not trying to

pressure Heslin based on political contributions and that no one had even suggested that he do so. In addition, although Heslin thought that Carter was close to McLarty, and therefore might do something on his behalf, this was not the fact. In his two years at the Energy Department, Carter had spoken to McLarty on the phone a few times, but had never met with him personally. Furthermore, no one but Carter contacted Heslin in the spring of 1996 with any type of request that Tamraz have a meeting with the President. Finally, Heslin's speculation is contradicted by testimony establishing that Tamraz had not in fact requested a meeting with the President and that no one in the White House even contacted Tamraz after April of 1996. See full text of chapter for a full discussion of these issues as well as supporting citations

198. Staff interview with Nancy Soderberg, 5/30/97; Minority counsel, 9/17/97 Hrg., pp. 40-41.

199. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., pp. 67, 169; Exhibits 1065 & 1066.

200. Roger Tamraz, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 170.

201. Senator Levin, 9/18/97 Hrg., p. 170.